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NOTES
UNDERPRODUCTIVE TRUST PROPERTY IN FLORIDA:
SACRIFICING YEARLY RETURN FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
CONVENIENCE*
INTRODUGrION

The trustee directed to pay income to one trust beneficiary for a period of

time and subsequently to remit the principal to another is expected to act
prudently to maximize both the life tenant's and the remainderman's interests.1
His duty is to strike a fair balance between the need to maintain an adequate
current flow of cash to the income beneficiary, while accumulating and protecting the trust principal for its future recipient.2 Even the most conscientious
trustee can find himself in a quandary, however, when he must deal with certain
trust properties which may be unquestionably solid investments in terms of
either high yield or a safe eventual recoupment, but do not satisfy the expectations of both successive beneficiaries. This difficulty is compounded when a
testamentary trust is being administered because the settlor is unavailable as
an arbiter in the matter.
Accordingly, underproductive 3 trust assets can constitute a major problem
for the fiduciary. Although such properties as long-term growth stocks,4 valuable paintings, and unimproved land may well satisfy the desires of the
remainderman, the life tenant could receive little or no currently-flowing income. To avoid liability to the life tenant for resultant losses, the trustee might
attempt to look to the trust instrument for guidance, but its language is often
subject to different interpretations or is silent on this issue.5 Because Florida
law no longer generally requires a trustee to petition the court to determine
the propriety of his actions, the trustee would best be served by a fixed, basic
*ErroR's NoTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the Fall 1979 quarter.
1. See generally A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 232 (3d ed. 1967).
2. Id. § 240.
3. "Underproductive" as used in this note describes property which does not produce an
adequate return for the income beneficiary, and is interchangeable with the word "unproductive." Older Florida law in this area, FLA. STAT. § 690.12 (1937), followed the lead of the

original

UNIFORM PRmNCiPAL AND INcomE

AcT (1931) (U.P.I.A.) in using the term "unproduc-

tive estate." The revised U.P..A, (1962) refers to "underproductive property." Florida has
followed this lead. FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1979).
4. See Estate of Bissinger, 212 Cal. App. 2d 831, 834, 28 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1963) for a discussion of how a trustee should deal with a trust consisting primarily of long-term low current
yield "glamour issue" stocks. See generally G.BOGERT, TRUSiS AND TRUSTEES §§ 841-859 (2d ed.
1962). See also text accompanying notes 208-223 infra.
5. For suggestions on provisions the trust settlor should include to avoid problems with
underproductive property, see Clark, Power to Invest Without Yield, 10D TR. & ESr. 495, 496
(1961).
6. See generally FLA. STAT. § 737.402 (1979) on trust administration, which gives trustees
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rule which would allow him to adjust the competing interests equitably without having to take the extraordinary measure of asking a court's advice.7
The most common approach to underproductive trust property is that
taken by the Restatement of Trustss and the Uniform Principal and Income
Act,9 which mandate a future sale of the income-deficient asset, apportioning
the proceeds between the successive beneficiaries. 10 The 1975 revision of Florida
probate and trust law included an innovative modification of this general rule.
By requiring each trust asset to produce a specified level of annual income in
lieu of apportionment," the 1975 statute granted a considerably higher percentage of required income than most other state laws.12
However, by enacting the 1977 amendment to the underproductive trust
property law,' 3 the Florida legislature apparently attempted to accommodate
the wishes of the trustee at the expense of the income beneficiary. Although the
annual income payment requirement has been retained, the current statute
merely states that a minimum rate of return by the entire trust estate must be
achieved. 14 This new law in effect authorizes the trustee to retain underproductive assets, which in most circumstances would violate the generally accepted
prudent man rule for trust investments.15 The fiduciary's traditional duty to

tremendous powers to make any prudent transactions within the guidelines of proper practice
and the trust instrument. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 733.612 (1979) for the equivalent powers of a personal

representative.
7. See Younger, Apportioning Receipts From Wasting and Unproductive Assets: A Comment on the New Principaland Income Act, 40 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 1118, 1121 (1965). The drafters
of the U.P.I.A. stated that they intended to provide for "as simple and convenient administration of the estate as is consistent with fairness to all beneficiaries." U.P.I.A. (1931) (Commissioners Prefatory Note).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 240-241 (1959).
9. See U.P.I.A. § 12 (1962).
10. Apportionment was the common law remedy and is still used by most states, the Restatement, and the U.P.I.A. See generally notes 18-24 and accompanying text, infra.
II. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1) (1975) stated that if a trust asset did not produce at least two
percent of its inventory value in any year, the fiduciary was directed to pay the income beneficiary four percent of the inventory value plus any carrying charges upon the asset paid out of
income during that year.
12. Although the 1931 and 1962 versions of the U.P.I.A. granted respectively five and four
percent of the net sale proceeds of the underproductive asset along with incidental expenses,
the life cestui actually rceived much more under the 1975 statute. The 1931 provision, which
is still the law in fifteen states, failed to reimburse the life cestui for one year of the property's
income-deficiency. U.P.I.A. § 11(3) (1931). Although the 1962 U.P.I.A. has eliminated this
problem, the life tenant is still forced to wait until the asset is disposed of, which delays reinvestment of the property longer than would probably have been the situation under the
1975 Florida law. In contrast, the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 241 (1959) uses a nebulous
"current rate of return on trust investments" standard which would be difficult to apply in
practice. See text accompanying notes 96-106, infra.
13. See FLA. STAT. § 738.12(l)-.12(2) (1979). Compare this provision with FLA. STAT.
§ 738.12(1) (1975).
14. Id.
15. See FLA. STAT. §§ 518.11, 737.302 (1979). See also notes 192-193 and accompanying text,
infra.
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purge the trust property of low or no income-generating assets 6 has therefore
inexplicably been removed with only limited solace to the life tenant.
This note will explore the various doctrinal attempts to solve the problem
of underproductive trust property, and examine the present course that Florida
has chosen in this field. Particular emphasis will be placed on the common law
methods incorporated into the Uniform Principal and Income Act,' 7 which
thirty-six states have now partially or completely adopted.-8 In addition, the
methods which a Florida fiduciary and trust instrument draftsman could employ to deal with this difficulty are analyzed. As a suggested substitute to the
current Florida underproductive trust property provision, an alternative statute
will be proposed insuring better protection of the interests of all concerned
parties.
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH:

THEs DUTIES OF SALE AND APPORTIONMENT
At common law,19 courts responded to the income beneficiary's plight by
forcing sale of underproductive asset and apportionment of the net proceeds.20
When granted, this remedy gave the life cestui a portion of the receipts upon
the future sale of the property,2 ' reimbursing him for the loss of income during
16. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TRUSTS § 241, Comment b (1959).
17. See Younger, supra note 7, at 1122-26.
18. See lists of states at 7A UN~oRPm LAWS ANNOTATED 15-16 (Supp. 1979). Twenty-one
states have embraced the 1962 version, while fifteen states still use the 1931 provisions.
19. See, e.g., Wallace v. Julier, 3 So. 2d 711, 718 (Fla. 1941); see generally A. ScoTT, supra
note I, §§ 240-241, which describe the past history of apportionment. Florida initially followed
much of the common law approach.
20. See A. ScOT, supra note 1. §§ 240-241. Florida adopted the apportionment method
through its enactment of the U.P.I.A. in 1937, but dropped it in the 1975 revision of the
principal and income provisions. The 1977 amendments failed to reinstate this procedure.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 690.12 (1937) with FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1975) and FLA. STAT. § 738.12

(1979).
21. The most commonly-applied equation for determining the income beneficiary's share
of the net proceeds of sale is that found in the Restatement, which uses a formula similar to
the one involved in discounting a note or other future cash sum obligation. If "X" equals the
amount of permanent principal to be retained after sale, "A" equals the number of years for
which the life cestui was entitled to income, "B" equals "the current yearly rate of return on
trust investments" and "C" equals the net proceeds of the sale, the proper equation will be
X + ABX = C. Therefore, X = C/(1 + AB). REsTATE ENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 241 (1959)
(Comment i contains illustrations of the application of this formula).
Although the above method appears fairly easy to apply in practice, it suffers the major
drawback of reliance on the Restatement's confusing standard of "the current rate of return"
as the amount a trust asset is expected to generate. However, it does have the advantage of
allowing proceeds to pass to the life cestui regardless of whether the property was sold at an
amount greater or lesser than its inventory value. A. Scorr, supranote 1, § 241.1.
An alternate scheme has been adopted in New York and New Jersey in certain situations
for allocation of apportionment receipts. Where "P" equals the aggregate principal, "I" equals
the unpaid interest, "C" equals the sale proceeds, "X" equals the life tenant's share, and "R"
equals the remaindermen's share, the equations will be I(P + I) = X/C and P/(P + I) = X/C.
Bailey & Rice, The Duties of a Trustee with Respect to Defaulted Mortgage Investments, 84
U. PA. L. REV. 157, 173 (1936). See, e.g., In re Myers' :Estate, 161 N.Y.S. 1111 (Surr. Ct. 1916).
The primary difference between the two methods is that in the first scheme, the income bene-
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the holding period of the asset. 22 Although contrary to the general rule that all
gain realized from the sale of trust assets is allocated to principal, 23 apportionment was a necessary equitable exception helping both beneficiaries through
sale and reinvestment. 2
The first step toward allowing apportionment was finding of a duty to sell
the underproductive property. 25 Because courts attempted to effect the settlor's
intent, when this duty was specified in the trust instrument, sale and equitable
conversion2 of the asset were usually ordered.2 7 Similarly, if the trust instrument indicated an intent to have a disposition and reinvestment of the proceeds
of such an asset, but not to split the receipts between the current and future
beneficiaries, no apportionment was allowed.28 Finally there was no such requirement of sale if the settlor had expressly stated that the particular underproductive property should be retained.29 However, where the asset was a
tremendous burden on the trust, courts sometimes permitted deviation and
directed a sale as a practical necessity, notwithstanding contrary language in
the trust instrument.30
A confusing situation often ensued if the terms of the trust merely included
a general authorization to retain trust property.31 Such language was construed
as either calling for retention of underproductive assets3 2 or simply allowing
ficiary receives income at the average trust yield, while in the latter system the rate of interest
stated in the defaulted obligation controls. G. BOGERT, supra note 4, § 825.
22. G. BOGERT, supra note 4, § 825; A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 241.1.
23. See FLA. STAT. §738.03(2)(h) (1979) exempting FLA. STAT. §738.12 (1979) from the
normal requirement. See generally Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228
(1964).
24. In re Will of Haldeman, 208 Misc. 419, 143 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Surr. Ct. 1955). See generally
Note, Underproductive Trust Assets in New York, 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 259 (1962).
25. See, e.g., Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273, 273, 174 N.E. 493, 494 (1931).
26. Underproductive real property under the equitable conversion doctrine is treated as
money which may be alternately distributed to income and corpus as long as the trust instrument includes an express or implied direction to effect this transmutation process. Archer
v. Puffer, 146 Fla. 568, 1 So. 2d 565 (1941). However, there is a strong desire under Florida law
for land to pass in specie because testators "don't just bequeath cash money in fee simple
absolute." In re Estate of Smith, 200 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1967).
27. See Walker v. Thomas, 75 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1935), which indicated that a court
might reject the literal meaning of the trust instrument language in order to carry out the
settlor's intent of allowing apportionment. See also In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 2d
598, 151 P.2d 298, 302 (Cal. 2d D.C.A. 1944).
28. G. BOGERT, supranote 4, § 829; A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 241.2.
29. York v. Maryland Trust Co., 149 Md. 608, 131 A. 829 (1926). This is also the Florida
approach. FLA. STAT. §§ 737.302, 401 (1979).
30. See, e.g., In re Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Surr. Ct. 1931), aff'd 237 App.
Div. 808, 260 N.Y.S. 975 (Ist Dep't 1932). But see Comment, Trusts-Deviation Because of
Unforeseen Circumstances- Invasion of Vested Remainder for the Benefit of the Beneficiary,
30 MINN. L. Rav. 553 (1946), which noted that deviation will be only rarely permitted where
the interests of another beneficiary will be invaded without his consent.
31. This problem is especially acute for testamentary trusts, which are the focal point of
this note, because the determination of the settlor's intent in such a situation may be virtually
impossible. For speculation on equivalent income-deficient asset matters in inter vivos trusts,
see Shattuck, Unproductive Trust Property in Massachusetts, 20 B.U. L. REv. 447, 458 (1940).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TRusTs § 240, Comment g (1959). But see In re Johnson's
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otherwise imprudent investments to remain part of the portfolio.33 As determining factors, courts examined whether the asset in question was specifically
mentioned in the trust instrument,34 particularly if the settlor had been aware
of its underproductivity;,3 whether the property constituted only a small proportion of the net worth of the estate;3 6 and whether the trust purposes re3
vealed certain close relationships between the settlor and his beneficiaries. 7 If
the court found at least one of the above factors, then the trust document was
usually construed as imposing no duty to sell.3 8 In at least one case, however, a
sympathetic court directed the disposition of underproductive property despite
the instrument's clear language calling for its retention. 9
A split of authority existed where there was neither a direction to retain
trust properties nor an express duty to sell. 40 The strict view looked directly to
the settlor's probable intent as the controlling factor in the apportionment
question.41 Courts adhering to this concept took the position that unless the
settlor expressly manifested an intent to require the trustee to dispose of the
underproductive property, 42 no apportionment would be granted.43 However,

Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Suir. Ct. 1947), for the concept that only a clear contrary manifestation
of the settior's intent would negate a duty to sell.
33. "Wasting property," which generally consists of depletable natural or personal resource assets such as oil wells, mines, timber land, patents and copyrights, often qualifies as a
type of "overproductive property" because such property produces income but may leave
nothing for the remaindermen. A. ScoTr, supra note 1, § 239.
34. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schuster, 175 Misc. 1072, 27 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
35. Id. But cf. Lambertville Nat'l Bank v. Bumster, 141 N.J. Eq. 396, 57 A.2d 525 (Ch.
1948) (allowing the sale of low-dividend and declining value securities despite express language
in the trust instrument requiring these assets to be retained).
36. In re Marshall, 136 Misc. 116,238 N.Y.S. 763 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
37. RsrATEMENT (SEcoND) oF Thusrs § 240, Comment g (1959). When the income beneficiary is a surviving spouse or other close relative of the settlor, this familial relationship has
often been the strongest incentive for a court to grant apportionment. See In re Shepard,
186 Misc. 564, 568, 59 N.Y.S.2d 803, 809 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
38. A. ScoTr, supra note 1, § 240.1.
39. See note 35 supra. See generally Lambertville Nat'l Bank v. Bumster, 141 N.J. Eq. 396,

57 A.2d 525 (Ch. 1948).
40. A. ScoTr, supra note 1, § 240.1. However, most states now set a specific percentage of
income as an "underproductivity level" triggering the fiduciary's duty to pay the life cestui a
certain yearly amount. See note 12 supra. Only the Restatement and Professor Scott begrudgingly support the nebulous payment standard of "substantially less than the current rate
of return on trust investments." ~srATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TRUsTs § 241 (1959); A. Scorr, supra
note 1, § 241.
41. This was the position taken in Massachusetts, Greed v. Connelly, 272 Mass. 241, 172
N.E. 106 (1930), and New York, In re Satterwhite, 262 N.Y. 339, 186 N.E. 857 (1933), and
later followed in Missouri, Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S.W.2d 404
(1949).
42. Generally, if the grantor's intent can be discerned from the trust instrument, the
document controls. See, e.g., FMA. STAT. § 737.402(2) (1979). But see Lambertville Nat'l Bank
v. Bumster, 141 N.J. Eq. 396, 57 A.2d 525, 526 (Ch. 1948).
43. See note 45 infra. For a more lenient view towards granting apportionment, see In re
Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 579, 249 N.Y.S. 87, 93 (Surr. Ct. 1931), afl'd, 237 App. Div. 808, 260
N.Y.S. 975 (Ist Dep't 1932).
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the cases supporting this doctrine44 may have been decided on their own facts.4 5
47
For example, in Creed v. Connelly,46 a Massachusetts court denied apportion48
partly because the land
ment of the proceeds of an already sold vacant lot
0
49
re Marshall's Estate,'
In
In
assets.
the
trust
of
small
portion
only
a
been
had
the court reasoned that apportionment was not necessary because the value of
51
the asset in question comprised less than one-twentieth of the total trust estate,
and the remaining trust income was more than adequate to sustain the life

cestui.52 Although presuming no intent to allow apportionment met the goals
3
this concept
of administrative convenience and certainty for the fiduciary,
54
life
tenant.
overly favored the remainderman to the detriment of the
5
The jurisdictions espousing the strict view " have apparently softened their

stances to a large extent.56 Applying the concept that a duty to sell exists if
8
under the circumstances- the settlor probably would have so intended,' the
9
New York Court of Appeals in the leading case of In re Rowland held an

44. See note 41 supra.
45. For an extensive discussion of the strict view cases and their progressional interrelation, see Note, Underproductive Trust Assets in New York, 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 259 (1962).
46. 272 Mass. 241, 172 N.E. 106 (1930).
47. Missouri and New York courts have also reached similar conclusions. See cases cited
note 41 supra, and Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N.Y. 495, 130 N.E. 625 (1921), modified per
curiam, 231 N.Y. 550, 132 N.E. 884 (1921).
48. The trustees sold the property ten years after the death of the settlor, but before the
death of the life cestui, his surviving spouse. 272 Mass. at 245, 172 N.E. at 107.
49. The fiduciaries received $34,000 net proceeds from the sale of the land, but the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the widow was only entitled to the $4,500
of income produced by the lot during the trust's ten year holding period. 272 Mass. at 248,
172 N.E. at 108. In addition, no reimbursement for carrying charges which had been paid out
of income was granted. Id. Cf. Harvard Trust Co. v. Duke, 304 Mass. 414, 24 N.E.2d 144 (1939)
(holding that where the testator was unaware of the asset's productivity, all carrying charges
should be paid from principal).
50. 136 Misc. 116, 238 N.Y.S. 763 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
51. The total value of the Marshall estate was $1,082,795.19, while the real estate for which
apportionment was desired sold for $45,520.83. 136 Misc. at 116, 238 N.Y.S. at 763-64. The
Surrogate's Court distinguished Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N.Y. 561, 109 N.E. 611 (1915),
where the trust fund held $8 million in unproductive real property, and Furniss v. Cruikshank,
230 N.Y. 495, 130 N.E. 625 (1921), modified, 231 N.Y. 550, 132 N.E. 884 (1921), which concerned a $1,400,000 total trust fund including a $490,000 parcel of land. The Marshall court
very carefully limited its holding to the facts of the case. 136 Misc. at 118, 238 N.Y.S. at 765.
For an opposing view of the proportion of the estate issue, see In re Johnson's Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d
621 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
52. In re Marshall's Estate, 136 Misc. 116, 119, 238 N.Y.S. 763, 765 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
53. This also apparently was the overriding purpose of the 1977 amendments to Florida's
underproductivity statute, FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1979). See notes 181-194 and accompanying
text, infra.
54. See A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 241.2.
55. See notes 41-54 and accompanying text, supra.
56. The New York courts in particular have decided to show more sympathy towards the
life cestui. See In re Knox' Will, 163 Misc. 264, 268, 296 N.Y.S. 745, 749 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
57. See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
58. The intent of the grantor of the trust property is the key element looked to by courts
in almost every trust situation. See note 41 and accompanying text, supra.
59. 273 N.Y. 100, 6 N.E.2d 393 (1937).
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equitable conversion appropriate to rid the trust of underproductive land. 60
This remedy was held applicable to property which was either unproductive at
the time of the creation of the trust 61 or which subsequently became unproduc3
tive,2 thus following the great weight of authority.6

However, the Rowland court limited the breadth of the rule6 4 by stressing
that its decision was based on the particular facts of the case, and that it did
not intend to lay down a general rule applicable to all underproductive assets. 65
To be affected by this doctrine, the trustee must have the discretionary power
of sale of trust assets,68 which may be converted into a mandatory duty of sale 6r
only when certain facts are present.S Important considerations in this situation
include whether the sale price of the underproductive property would exceed
its inventory value,6 9 the existence of a familial relationship between the settlor
and the beneficiaries,70 and the type of asset in question.71 Although the New
York Surrogate's Court later expressed the fear that Rowland might force all
apportionment cases to be litigated through the court of last resort,72 its narrow
application prevented this situation from materializing.
On various occasions a minority of courts have simply applied the Rowland
rule and required apportionment because the particular trust included beneficiaries with successive interests.73 If proven that the settlor desired the life
tenant to be the principal object of his bounty, 4 an intent to allow apportion-

60. The Rowland court indicated the fact that the settlor's widow was the income beneficiary had a significant effect upon its decision. 273 N.Y. at 110, 6 N.E.2d at 396.
61. See A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 241.3.
62. Id. Accord, In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 2d 598, 151 P.2d 298 (1944). See
REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TRUSTS § 240, Comment c (1959).
63. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS, § 240, Comment d (1959).
64. This rule was discussed in In re Knox' Estate, 163 Misc. 264, 296 N.Y.S. 745 (Surr. Ct.
1987). The Knox court pointed out how closely Rowland verged on adopting the Restatement
rule, which creates a duty to convert in all cases of underproductivity, 163 Misc. at 268, 296
N.Y.S. at 749.
65. 273 N.Y. at 110, 6 N.E.2d at 397.
66. This is contrary to the Restatement rule, which only allows specific language in the
trust instrument to override the duty of apportionment. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
TRusTS § 240, Comment g (1959).
67. Current state statutes modeled after the U.P.IA. set a certain percentage rate of
underproductivity to trigger apportionment. See note 12 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
69. The 1931 version of the U.P.I.A. and Florida's older unproductive estate statute, FLA.
STAT. § 690.12 (1937), denied apportionment entirely if the prospective sale would result in a
loss. See notes 139-142 and accompanying text, infra.
70. If the beneficiaries are the surviving spouse, children, or other lineal descendants of
the settlor, the chances of the court granting apportionment are considerably enhanced. See
In re Shepard's Estate, 186 Misc. 564, 59 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Surr. Ct. 1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS

§ 240, Comment g (1959).

71. See notes 78-89 and accompanying text, infra.
72. In re Knox' Estate, 163 Misc. 264, 268, 296 N.Y.S. 745, 749 (Sum. Ct. 1937).
73. See Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N.Y. 495, 130 N.E. 625, modified per curiam, 231 N.Y.
550, 132 N.E. 884 (1921); In re Rosenzweig's Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 142, 144, 148 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372
(Sur. Ct. 1955), afJ'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 969, 183 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't 1959).
74. See note 70 supra. See generally Comment, Apportionment Between Principal and
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ment has also been found7 5 Perhaps the best example of this situation has
occured where the respective life tenant and remainderman were the settlor's
surviving spouse and children.76 Some tribunals have appeared willing to grant
apportionment on this basis alone, especially if the surviving spouse was equally
7
dependent on the trust income as his or her primary source of sustenanceY.
If the underproductive asset in question is unimproved land, 8 there has
usually been little difficulty in having the asset sold and apportioned.7 9 Courts
have disagreed, however, where diverse assets are involved, such as mortgages,8 0
82
insurance renewal commissions,81 bonds in default or sold at a discount,

reversionary interests,"a personal chattels, 84 and perhaps most importantly from
an investment standpoint, corporate stocks.85 Most of the early cases involving
Income of Proceeds Derived From the Sale of Unproductive Realty Held in Trust, 40 YALE

L.J. 275 (1930).
75. In re Rowland's Estate, 273 N.Y. 100, 110, 6 N.E.2d 393, 396 (1937).
76. For an extensive discussion of this factor in the apportionment process, see In re
Shepard's Estate, 186 Misc. 564, 59 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
77. See In re Jackson, 258 N.Y. 281, 179 N.E. 496 (1932); see also Jordan v. Jordan, 192
Mass. 337, 78 N.E. 459 (1906), which distinguished an earlier Massachusetts case on these
grounds.
78. This has been the most common type of income-deficient property. See generally
A. ScoTr, supra note 1, § 241.1.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., San Antonio Loan & Trust Co. v. Hamilton, 155 Tex. 52, 283 S.W.2d 19
(1955). The underproductivity problem arises in this area where the trustee attempts to
salvage default upon a mortgage, either through foreclosure or taking a conveyance of a substituted parcel of land or personal property. If there is no controlling trust instrument provision, courts normally will force a conversion of the mortgage into more productive property
or cash, followed by apportionment along the lines of the Restatement equation at note 21
supra. See Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Wade, 305 Mass. 36, 39, 24 N.E.2d 764
(1940). For an example of the application of the old New York formula at note 21 supra, see
Quinn v. First Nat'l Bank, 168 Tenn. 30, 73 S.W.2d 692 (1934). Because of the equitable
nature of the remedy, the amounts distributed from defaulted mortgages to principal and
income are subject to a great deal of judicial discretion. In re Spear's Estate, 333 Pa. 199, 3
A.2d 789 (1939). For an extensive discussion of the common law approach in this field, see
Bailey & Rice, supra note 21; Note, Apportionment By the Trustee of Unproductive Mortgage
Proceeds Between Life Tenant and Remainderman, 49 HARV. L. REv. 805 (1936).
81. See, e.g., In re Pennock's Will, 285 N.Y. 475, 35 N.E.2d 177, 179, reh. denied, 286 N.Y.
690, 37 N.E.2d 58 (1941), which is the leading case in this area. The Pennock case involved
the right to receive commissions on renewal insurance premiums over a fifteen year period. In
modifying the lower court decision, the New York Court of Appeals classified the right to
commissions as "unproductive or partially productive" assets, and ordered apportionment
under the Restatement method of each payment as received. In applying this system, the court
followed its earlier decision in Rowland and extended the scope of apportionment from real
to personal property. 285 N.Y. at 486, 35 N.E.2d at 181.
82. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, 290 Mass. 377, 380, 195 N.E. 389 (1935);
G. BOGERT, supra note 4, § 826; A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 240.2.
83. See generally A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 241.1, on xeversionary interests.
84. The leading case determining that personalty may be considered underproductive
property is In re Clarke's Estate, 166 Misc. 807, 3 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1938), which is discussed at
notes 86-89 infra.
85. See notes 206-222 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of stocks as underproductive property.
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personalty as income-deficient property applied a nebulous standard of
"uniqueness" in determining when apportionment would be allowed. 6 One
court, for example, ruled that the asset in question had to have a "peculiar and
distinctive character" in order to qualify, probably to ensure that a ready
market existed for the property.8 7 If the asset could not be disposed of quickly,
perhaps a simple surcharge remedy against the trustee would be more appropriate. 8 Notwithstanding the earlier haggling over different tests for real and
personal property, modern underproductivity cases do not differentiate between them.8 9
Mayo A. Shattuck in 1940 proposed an "equitable rule"90 as an alternative
to strictly disallowing apportionment in the absence of any evidence of intent.
Shattuck believed that if the settlor had failed to express his intent on the
underproductivity problem in the trust instrument, it would be absurd for a
court to assume that he had wanted to retain an asset producing little or no
income. 91 If trust property was found to be underproductive, its allocable
carrying charges9 2 would be levied on the principal and the proceeds of the
required sale of the asset would be apportioned unless the settlor had clearly
demonstrated a contrary intent.93 Although the common law jurisdictions never
went this far, Shattuck's arguments were later endorsed by Professor Scott 94 and
subsequently incorporated into the Restatement of Trusts. 95

86. This was the rule of In re Clarke's Estate, 166 Misc. 807, 3 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1938). Clarke
concerned a valuable art collection which was the major portion of the trust corpus. Although
the paintings were a solid investment for the future, they failed to produce any current income
for the life tenant. The court held that they should be sold with the receipts divided among
the successive beneficiaries. 166 Misc. at 812, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
87. Id. The court carefully stated that it had established "no general rule directing an
apportionment should be made as to ordinary personalty." Id.
88. See Note, Underproductive Trust Assets in New York, 36 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 259, 273
(1962).
89. The Clarke rule was apparently abandoned in New York in In re Cuff's Will, 118
N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sur. Ct. 1953). Other jurisdictions also fail to distinguish between real and
personal property for apportionment purposes. Equitable Trust Co. v. Kent, 11 Del. Ch. 343,
101 A. 875 (1917); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 R.I 277, 160 A. 465 (1932);
Gate v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 178 Tenn. 249, 156 S.W.2d 812 (1941). Neither the U.P.IA.
nor the Restatement distinguish between them. U.P.I.A. § 12 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SJZcoND)
oF TRUSTS § 241, Comment b (1959).
90. See Shattuck, supra note 31, at 463.
91. Shattuck stated that: "To attempt to say that the testator had any intent upon this
matter, unless he clearly expresses it, is nothing short of absurd. Absurd, because when he
draws his will (a) he usually has a long way to go before he dies and he is the first to believe
that his will is not his final word, and (b) he doesn't even know that he will still own the
piece when he dies, and (c) he can't be certain, if he should still own it, that it will ever
become part of the trust at all, and (d) he has no means of knowing which of the beneficiaries
will outlive him, or (e) what their wants will be when the property does become unproduc.
tivel" Id. at 452.
92. See generally G. BOGERT, supra note 4, § § 802-807. See also FIA. STAT. § 738.03 (1979).
93. See Shattuck, supra note 31, at 463.
94. See generallyA. Scorr, supra note 1, §§ 240-241.
95. See RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §§ 240-241 (1959). Professor Scott was one of
the primary drafters of the Restatement provisions.
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THE RESTATEMENT APPROACH

The Restatement of Trusts9 6 dispensed with all of the foregoing tests of
the settlor's intent and adopted a far simpler method of apportionment determination. 9z The mere fact of underproductivity now created the duty to
sell, 9s based on the presumption that where a contrary express or implied intent could not be discerned from the trust instrument,9 the settlor intended
that the life tenant would benefit' 00 from each of the trust assets. 01 Any property which was considered underproductive, whether so determined at the time
of creation of the trust'0 2 or at a later date, 0 3 was usually sold and apportioned. 1 0 4 This procedure was mandated when the property produced "substantially less than the current rate of return on trust investments"' 0 5 and was
06
likely to remain income-deficient.1
A primary advantage of the Restatement's position is that it avoids the
necessity for a case-by-case consideration of the settlor's intent. 07 The flexibility
of its underproductivity standard 08 allows the life tenant to obtain apportionment fairly easily. However, if the equities of a particular fact situation substantially favor the remaindermen, courts can still deny this procedure within
the guidelines of the Restatement approach. 0 9 One example of this situation
would be where the life cestui desires to dispose of valuable paintings, which
produce no current income but are unquestionably solid investments for the
future. Unless he could show an immediate need for the income resulting from
their sale, a request for apportionment would probably be denied." 0
Dispositionof the UnderproductiveAsset
Although a court might find a duty to sell, a trustee does not automatically
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 241 (1959).
97. For the basic Restatement apportionment equation, see note 21 supra.
98. One of the earliest cases outside New York to apply this concept was Delaware Trust
Co. v. Bradford, 30 Del. Ch. 277, 59 A.2d 212 (1948). Cf. U.P.I.A. § 12 (1962) (setting a one
percent of inventory figure as the underproductivity standard).
99. Florida follows the doctrine that the terms of the trust instrument limit the trustee's
powers. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 737.402(2) (1979).
100. Several commentators have suggested that a fixed percentage trust is the best way of
ensuring that the income beneficiary enjoys a reasonable return from the trust properties. See
notes 266-269 and accompanying text, infra.
101. See Delaware Trust Co. v. Bradford, 30 Del. Ch. 277, 278, 59 A.2d 213, 213 (1948).
102. See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 R.I. 277, 160 A. 465 (1932). See
generally Skilton, The Rights of Successive Beneficiaries in Unproductive Trust Assets Not
Bearing Interest, 15 TEMP. U. L. Q. 241 (1941).
103. See In re Rowland's Estate, 273 N.Y. 100, 6 N.E.2d 393, 395 (1937).
104. See notes 19-24 supra.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 241 (1959).
106. Id.
107. See Comment, 58 Mic. L. REv. 1049, 1054 (1960).
108. See notes 12, 21 supra.
109. See Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S.W.2d 404 (1949).
110. This was the factual situation and result of In re Clarke's Estate, 166 Misc. 807, 3
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1938), which shows the potential inequity to the income beneficiary caused by the
uncertain Restatement standard.
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have to make an immediate sale of the property. 111 If the fiduciary is justified in
postponing the prospective sale for a prudent purpose,112 he will not be surcharged for the delay.' 3 In determining the reasonableness of his actions, a
4
court may consider such circumstances as the tax consequences of the sale,"1
the inventory value of the property,"x5 the characteristics of the portfolio as a
whole," ° and the likelihood of the property's future growth in value."17 If the
income beneficiary delays in complaining about the insufficient yield from an
asset, or otherwise fails to call its underproductivity to the trustee's attention,
the trustee may argue laches or estoppel to avoid liability."l s
Among states which have embraced the apportionment concept,"19 the most
common approach to the sale process is that adopted by the Restatement of
Trusts. 20 The underproductive asset is to be disposed of at the first reasonable
opportunity and transformed through equitable conversion' 21 into more 'acceptable trust investments. 2 2 Where there has been a delay in this changeover
process, the net proceeds of the sale are apportioned by computing "the sum
which with [simple] interest thereon at the current rate of return on trust
investments from the day when the duty to sell"' 2 3 was ascertained would equal
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TRuSTs § 241, Comment b (1959).
112. Valid reasons for delaying disposition of the asset include lack of a market, certainty
of later appreciation, and the necessity of preparing the property for sale. See generally,
Shattuck, Do Present Day Conditions and Modern Draftsmanship Imply a New Theory of
Trust Management?, 26 TR. BuLL. 17 (1947).
113. See A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 1240, at 2056.
114. Of particular importance for federal tax purposes would be the applicability of
capital gains treatment of the sale of the underproductive asset along with the effects of
apportionment on the distributable net income of the trust. See I.R.C. §§ 643(a)(3), 661, 662,
1202, 1221, 1231. Perhaps a more advisable procedure would be a like kind exchange of the
asset, thus allowing at least partial current nonrecognition of the gain realized from the disposition. See I.R.C. § 1031.
115. This is also an important factor in the initial determination of the existence of a
duty to sell. See notes 49-52 supra.
116. Note that Florida's current underproductive trust property statute allows retention
of an underproductive asset if the rest of the estate boosts the overall rate of return to three
percent. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1979).
117. See, e.g., In re Gross' Estate, 216 Cal. App. 2d 563, 568, 31 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1963), which
looked to the original as well as the fair market value of the property. Although the land in
question was underproductive as related to its then current value, it produced an income of
16% measured against its book value. The court therefore held that the prospects for future
growth were good, and denied apportionment. 216 Cal. App. 2d at 568-69, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
118. See Comment, Trust Administration-Apportionment and Other Remedies of an
Income Beneficiary When the Trustee's Retention of Unproductive Property Causes a Loss or
Termination of Income, 58 MicH.L. Rxv. 1049, 1061 (1960).
119. See note 12 supra.
120. REsTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF ThusTs §§ 240, 241 (1959). The U.P.I.A. has also embraced
this theory. U.P.I.A. § 12 (1962).
121. See note 26 supra.
122. One such example of a common asset transformation is that of low-yield into highyield stock. See Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 228, 238 (1964).
123. See A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 241. The U.P.I.A. has maintained the extremely low
required' yearly income productivity standard of one percent of inventory value. U.P.I.A. § 12
(1962). In some circumstances involving relatively low valued trusts, this amount could ap.
proach de minimus proportions for the life tenant. See Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113
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the amount realized from the sale. 124 This sum would then be allocated to the
trust principal, with the residue going to the income beneficiary.125
An important facet of this system is that the burden of paying certain expenses incurred in retention and sale of the underproductive property may be
shifted between income and corpus. 126 Insurance costs and real estate taxes,
usually a drain on the life tenant,127 are initially charged to principal." 2 The
trust source which had been responsible for carrying charges during the asset's
holding period is reimbursed from the sale proceeds, 129 and related costs such
as attorney's fees and broker's commissions are similarly delegated." 0
Although the income beneficiary does receive a degree of pecuniary benefit
from the sale and apportionment of the underproductive asset, this remedy is
not completely satisfactory. The life tenant must depend upon the trustee's
ability to locate a sometimes nonexistent market for the property.2 1 An added
disadvantage is the possible delay before final disposal. 32 Notwithstanding these
U. PA. L. REv. 228, 237 (1964). Florida's current law uses a three percent level, FLA. STAT.
§ 738.12(l)(a) (1979), in comparison with the 1975 statute's two percent amount. FLA. STAT.
§ 728.12(1) (1975).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TRUSTS § 241, Comment i (1959).
125. Id. Cf. In re Chapal's Will, 269 N.Y. 464, 199 N.E. 762 (1936) (illustrating the more
complex New York pro-rata approach applied to mortgages in default as underproductive
property). Apportionment in this area often amounts to a salvage operation because the trustee
is usually the buyer in resulting foreclosure sale. See, e.g., In re Otis' Will, 276 N.Y. 101, 11
N.E.2d 556 (1937). Under the pro-rata method, the net proceeds are allocated between
principal and income in the ratio which the principal sum due of the mortgage bears to the
interest payable. See Bailey & Rice, supra note 21. The results of this system differ from those
attained under the Restatement only where the mortgage's interest rate is not that of the
current trust rate. Id.
The most significant problems associated with the New York approach involve unfairness
to the remainderman. First, by following the mortgage's interest rate, the income beneficiary
could conceivably be awarded a higher level of return than that of the standard trust investment. The court in In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 2d 598, 151 P.2d 298 (1944), recognized this potential windfall and named this as one reason for choosing the Restatement
method instead. Id. at 610-11, 151 P.2d at 305-06. Secondly, the mortgage rate has been held
applicable under the New York method even where the foreclosure sale has already taken
place. This situation harms the future beneficiary because he may lose from the principal the
difference between the expected interest rate and that actually derived from the sale. See
generally Comment, Determination of the Respective Interests of Life Tenant and Remainderman in the Proceedsof an Unproductive Mortgage, 24 VA. L. REv. 572 (1938).
Texas and New Jersey have also followed the pro-rata approach. See Hudson County Nat'l
Bank v. Woodruff, 122 N.J. Eq. 444, 194 A. 266, modified, 123 N.J. 585, 199 A. 399 (1937); San
Antonio Loan & Trust Co. v. Hamilton, 155 Tex. 52, 283 S.W.2d 19 (1955).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 241(3) (1959).
127. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 738.13(1)(a) (1979).
128. See, e.g., In re Cronise's Estate, 167 Misc. 310, 316, 6 N.Y.S.2d 392, 399 (Surr. Ct. 1937).

129.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TRUSTS

§ 241, Comment h (1959). See also In re Chapal's

Estate, 161 Misc. 67, 292 N.Y.S. 663 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
130. Although under FLA. STAT. § 728.13(l)(a) (1979) the income beneficiary seems to be
slighted because selling expenses are normally paid from the principal, this switch from
principal to sales proceeds appears reasonable, because the sale was forced for his benefit.
131. For an example of the problems involved, see the discussion of the blockage question
in stock disposal in In re Estate of Bayles, 108 N.J. Super. 446, 459-60, 261 A.2d 684, 691 (1970).
132. A particularly perplexing related issue is the allocation of stock dividends between
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drawbacks, most states still embrace the concept of apportionment as a statutory

means of providing the life tenant with some solace.

33

The FormerFloridaApproach: The Uniform
Principaland Income Act
In 1937, Florida adopted verbatim as its first statute in this area the Uniform Principal and Income Act provision pertaining to an "unproductive
estate."13 4 The 1937 law applied a set percentage to determine underproductivity, a major change from the Restatement and common law method of calculating income deficiencies on a case-by-case basis.35 In order to create a duty to
sell, the asset under scrutiny after 1931 had to produce an average net income of
less than one percent per annum of its inventory value. 36 This standard constituted a vast improvement over the nebulous common law approach, 37 but
the low rate chosen as the base amount often failed to aid the income beneficiary sufficiently. When applied to relatively small dollar value properties, the
one percent return standard constituted so niggardly a return as to almost
38
reach the de minimus level.
A major problem with the old Florida law was its failure to permit apportionment of property sold at a loss. 39 The income beneficiary could only re40
ceive as his share of the sales receipts the excess paid over the inventory value.
If this amount was unascertainable, he was entitled to the figure obtained by
subtracting from the net sale proceeds the asset's fair market value at the time
of the creation of the trust or its cost if purchased later.' 4' In contrast, the
common law doctrine deemed both the selling price of the property and its
value upon receipt by the trustee as completely immaterial so that the entire
sales proceeds were apportioned. 42
Contrary to the traditional rule, the statute created a rebuttable presump-

corpus and income during the interim period prior to sale. See Wells, Pity the Poor Income
Beneficiary:How to Reconcile Growth and Yield?, 103 TR. & EST. 119 (1964).
133. Apparently, of the thirty-six states adopting either the 1931 or 1962 versions of the
U.P..A., only Florida has rejected its apportionment procedure. See U.P.IA., Table of
Jurisdictions (1931) (1962).
134. FrA. STAT. § 690.12 (1937). This was the law in Florida until June 1, 1975, when FLA.
STAT. § 738.12 (1975) became effective.
135. See Wallace v. Julier, 147 Fla. 420, 3 So.2d 711 (1941); RESTATEMENT (SEcoNn) or
TRus's § 241, Comment 1 (1959).
136. FIA. STAT. § 690.12(1) (1937). See also U.P.I.A. § 11(1) (1931).
137. The Restatement applies the common law standard of "substantially less than the
current rate of return on trust investments." RrsrATEMIENT (SEcoND) oF TRuSTS § 241 (1959).
138. See Burd, The Uniform Principaland Income Act: A Plea for Uniformity, 109 TR. &
EsT. 762, 763 (1970).
139. FLA. STAT. § 690.12(2) (1937) stated that "in no event shall such income be more than
the amount by which the net proceeds exceed the inventory value of the property or in default
thereof its market value at the time the principal was established or its cost where purchased

later."
140. Id.
141.

See A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 241A.

142. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N.Y. 561, 564, 109 N.E. 611 (1915).
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tion that the duty to sell 143 first arose one year after either the date the trustee
received the property as underproductive, or the time the asset subsequently
became so deficient.144 This provision illustrated the worst aspect of Florida's
old apportionment method because the life cestui lost the equivalent value of
one year's income from the underproductive asset even if its sale was later
mandated.145
1 7
The only Florida underproductive property case,1 46 In re Russell's Will,
dealt with this limitation on the right of the income beneficiary to gain a more
equitable share of the apportioned funds. An Orlando bank serving as personal
representative of the estate and trustee of its testamentary trust sought a
declaratory judgment regarding the applicability and interpretation of section
690.12, Florida Statutes. 14 8 The trust consisted of one parcel of real property
which produced little or no income, and all the interested parties had stipulated
that the land was underproductive for the purposes of the above statute.1 49 At
issue was the date from which the duty to sell the trust asset commenced:
September 7, 1967, the date the bank received letters testamentary; August 31,
1968, one year after decedent's death; or August 7, 1970, when the bank qualified as trustee. 1 0
The Russell court noted that under Florida law "personal representative"
could be substituted for "trustee" in the state's Principal and Income provisions,151 and that a personal representative takes possession of the estate's real
property upon issuance of letters.152 Therefore, the court held the duty arose on
September 8, 1968.153 If the court had adopted the remainderman's argument
that the qualifying date of the trustee was so applicable, the decedent's
daughter, as the life tenant, would have lost nearly three years of income.154

143.

See notes 25-30 supra for a discussion of the general duty to sell.

144.

FLA. STAT.

§ 690.12(3) (1937).

145. See, e.g., In re Russell's Will, 40 Fla. Supp. 117 (Orange County Cir. Ct. 1974).
146. The reason for this scarcity of case law is unknown and rather perplexing, because
Florida has now had an underproductive property statute for sixty-two years. Other states
which, like Florida, also have a great deal of trust activity, such as New York and Massachusetts, have been faced with much more judicial activity in this area. See generally Younger,
supra note 7. The probable reasons for the lack of Florida cases are the tremendous latitude
granted by the legislature to the fiduciary, FLA. STAT. §§ 690.12, 737.402 (1979), and the ease
with which the statutes could be satisfied because of their low (1-3%) expected rates of return.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1979).
147. 40 Fla. Supp. 117 (Orange County Cir. Ct. 1974).
148. Note that Russell was decided less than one year before the underproductive property
statute was completely revised. A different result may have been reached under FLA. STAT.
§ 738.12 (1975).
149. 40 Fla. Supp. at 119 (Orange County Cir. Ct. 1974).
150. Id.
151. Circuit Judge George N. Diamantis held that FLA. STAT. § 733.011 (1974) of the
Florida Probate Code stated that for decedents' estates entered into probate after July 1, 1965,
"personal representative" and "trustee" were synonymous for the purposes of Chapter 690 of
the Florida Statutes. Id.
152. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 733.401,733.612 (1979).
153. 40 Fla. Supp. at 120 (Orange County Cir. Ct. 1974).
154. If the qualifying date of August 7, 1970, had been applied by the court, any rights
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The ultimate result of Russell is justified as mitigating the harsh consequences
of the statutory presumption, especially in the common situation ,where a
private individual or corporate entity acts in both fiduciary capacities 5 In
such a case, no excuse exists for delaying sale and apportionment because underproductive property could be identified as such immediately upon its receipt
by the estate. 5" Notwithstanding the carefully formulated reasoning in Russell,
the state legislature decided one year later to revamp totally the Floridasystem

of dealing with underproductive property.
The 1975 Innovation:
Yearly Payment of Substituted Income
In 1975, as part of the complete revision of the probate and trust sections of
the Florida Statutes, 57 the legislature departed from the common law and
Uniform Principal and Income Act's delayed sale and apportionment doctrine
by enacting a statute requiring yearly reimbursement of the life tenant by the
trustee. 5 8 Underproductive property was redefined as any .portion of the
corpus held for appreciation which failed in any year to yield a net income of

two percent of its inventory value. 5 9 At the dose of the trust's fiscal year, the
trustee had to pay the income beneficiary, using the quickest available cash
source of the trust corpus, an amount equal to four percent of the inventory
value of the asset.' 60 The life tenant was also reimbursed for any related carrying charges previously paid from income less any income received and the value
61
of any beneficial use of the property by the income beneficiary in that year.
However, courts could no longer force the sale of the asset. If the underproductive property was disposed of, the income beneficiary was only entitled to the
amounts unpaid under the percentage requirement.162
to lost income for the time period between the September 7, 1967, letters issuance date and
the former date would not have been recognized.
155. Quite often a corporate or private trustee will "wear both hats"in this manner in
order to save time and money, along with theoretically best serving the needs of the estate and
its related testamentary trust. For an example of the problems involved with underproductive
stock as trust property where one entity fills both positions, see In re Estate of Beach, 41 Cal.
App. d 774, 116 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1974), aff'd as modified, 542 P.2d 994, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570

(1975).
156. FiA. STAT. § 733.607 (1979) prescribes the proper steps for the personal representative's collection of the estate assets, and in conjunction with F"A, STAT. § 733.608 (1979), shows
that he may quickly assemble and examine the involved property and discern its incomeproduction nature and potential.
157. Chapters 733 and 737 of the Florida Statutes, relating to administration of estates and
trusts, were both subjected to extensive modifications. See generally Fenn & Korean, The 1974
FloridaProbate Code -A Marriageof Convenience, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1974).
158. See FiA. STAT. § 738.12 (1975).

159. Id. § 738.12(1).
160. Id. § 738.12(1)(a)-(b).
161. Id. Note that these provisions for yearly income payment to the life cestui are~very
similar to the equivalent amounts provided under the revised U.P.IA. rule of apportionment.
See U.PJ.A. § 12 (1962).
162. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(2) (1975) stated that "[u]pon the sale of the property the income
beneficiary shall not be entitled to any portion of the proceeds of sale, except that any
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Courts163 and commentators 64 have long stated that yearly income payments
in lieu of apportionment would be impractical and unfair to both successive
beneficiaries. By distributing current funds rather than waiting for a sale, the
amount of the income would depend solely on an estimation of the value of the
underproductive asset, which later might be sold for a much higher or lower
price.165 In addition, the remainderman's interest is decreased by the payments
66
out of corpus.
However, these contentions are adequately countered by legislative provisions and practical realities. Through the abolition of a remedy dependent
upon sale, the trustee is relieved of the onerous burden of handling the complex
system of allocation of the resulting proceeds between the successive beneficiaries.167 The statutory percentage rate of required return' 68 insures that the
life cestui receives an equitable distribution, rather than having to rely upon
the speculative market. 169 The remainderman can also benefit because the income beneficiary might be accepting a lower yield than he would have gained
under apportionment, therefore providing funds towards the retention of the
underproductive asset. 170 The future taker would in this manner be relieved of
amount determined in subsection (1) that remains unpaid at the time of sale shall be paid
therefrom."
163. The leading case espousing this concept is In re Winthrop's Estate, 168 Misc. 861, 6
N.Y.S.2d 539 (Surf. Ct. 1938). The trust estate therein included $50,000 in cash and liquid
securities and $390,000 of bonds in default. The court denied the income beneficiary's request
that some of the trust's liquid assets be sold, with the proceeds split between principal and
income in anticipation of the prospective disposal and apportionment of the underproductive
bonds. The life tenant was given rights to such proceeds only after actual sale. The court
stated, "It would introduce an unprecedented and dangerous element into the administration
of estates if liquid assets could be devoted to income payments because other capital assets do
not pay interest currently ....There is no warrant for apportionment until there are proceeds
to be apportioned." (emphasis in original) Id. at 868, 6 N.YS.2d at 541.
164. See, e.g., A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 241.1.
165. Because underproductive assets are often quite difficult to sell on the open market,
it may be extremely hard to place a definite fair market value on such property. However, a
Florida trustee still should be under a burden to act prudently to dispose of the asset as
quickly as possible in order to mitigate the resulting drain on the principal. The spectre of a
surcharge may help override any of the fiduciary's fears of insufficient sales proceeds. See FLA.
STAT. §§ 518.11, 787.302 (1979). Unfortunately, the current underproductive property statute,
FLA. STAT. § 788.12 (1979), does not clearly indicate the extent of this duty of speedy conversion, which the proposed statute in the Appendix attempts to rectify. See Appendix, infra.
166. However, if the trustee fails to ameliorate this situation within a reasonable period
of time, he could be subject to surcharge by the remainderman. See A. ScoTr, supra note 1,

§ 281.
167. See note 21 supra for the types of apportionment allocation formulas most often
adopted.
168. See notes 159-162 and accompanying text, supra. The current statute now uses a dual
three percent standard for both required productivity and yearly substituted income. FLA. STAT.
§ 738.12(l)(a) (1979).
169. See notes 26, 165 supra.
170. One commentator has argued a similar justification exists for his system of "anticipatory apportionment" of stock proceeds. Aronstein, Toward Growth With Fair Return, 104 TR.
& EST. 788, 789 (1965). The income beneficiary would be allocated the amount by which the
interest from a selected alternative bond investment exceeds his dividend income. Id. This
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his normal burden of paying the asset's carrying charges.1 7 1
The advantages of the yearly substituted income method72 greatly outweigh any potential difficulties. Unless the trust instrument expressly provides
otherwise, the life tenant is presumed to be the natural object of the settlor's
bounty,-7 and should be entitled to a steady flow of income. 17 4 Florida courts
have traditionally maintained that even where the settlor has directed that the
trustees have "absolute discretion" in allocating trust receipts between income
and principal, this broad fiduciary power must be exercised to insure that adequate provisions are made for each successive beneficiary. 75 In uncertain cases,
the interests of the life tenant are to be preferred over those-of the remainderman. 76 The old apportionment statute, 17 7 which was unusable by the suffering
income beneficiary in most situationsy1s has been replaced by a law which
allows the judicial system to exercise this sympathetic policy fully for the first
time.1' 9
The 1977 Revisions:
A Giant Step Backward
In 1977, the Florida legislature without much fanfare or consideration

s0

method limits the amount of related distributable income in any one year to such funds as the

trust could actually have realized, and prevents the remainderman from obtaining all of the
appreciation benefits. Id. See also Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 228,

252-55 (1964). Note that the system applied above is that used in In re Wehner's Will, 238
Wis. 557, 300 N.W. 241 (1941), which is extensively discussed at notes 210-222 and accompanying text, infra.
171. See FA. STAT. § 758.13(3)(b) (1979). See also Delaware Trust Co. v. Bradford, 30 Del.
Ch. 277, 59 A.2d 212 (1948).
172. This system is so labeled because it provides current funds to the income beneficiary
in amounts similar to those which he would have received if either the underproductive asset
had been sold and apportioned, or if the property had produced a reasonable rate of return.
173.

See Early, Adventures in the New Principaland Income Law, 50 FLA. B.J. 542, 542-44

,(1976). Early contended that "[t]he new [1974-75] law [was] a substantial improvement over the
old" and was "at almost every juncture income-oriented," id., but expressed a somewhat
ambivalent attitude towards certain provisions, including FIA. STAT. § 738.12 (1975).
174. FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1975) provided for a four percent current income payment, which
was amended in 1977, for no apparent reason, to three percent. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(l)(a) (1979).
Regardless, both of these amounts are too low, to ensure a reasonable xeturn. See note 283 and
accompanying text, infra.
175. Florida strongly supports this doctrine. See, e.g., Wallace v. Julier, 147 Fla. 420, 3
So. 2d 711 (1941).
176. Id. at 437, 3 So. 2d at 717.
177. FI.A. STAT. § 690.12 (1937).
178. Most underproductive property dispositions resulted in a net loss, rendering the 1937
statute inapplicable. See notes 139-142 and accompanying text, supra.
179. See Wallace v. Julier, 147 Fla. 420, 436, 3 So. 2d 711, 717 (1941).
180. The amendments to FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1975) were slipped in as part of a Senate
bill modifying FLA. STAT. § 758.04(2) (1975). Representatives Frank and Richmond added these
changes to the underproductive property statute after the general bill had already passed the
Florida House and Senate Judiciary Committees. As so amended, the bill passed both houses
without dissent and was approved by then-Governor Askew as ch. 77-254, Laws of Florida
(current FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1979)) on June 6, 1977, with an effective date of October 1, 1977.
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amended its yearly substituted income approach in a manner potentially
disastrous to the interests of the life tenant. Although the drafters of the statute
threw a small bone to the income beneficiary by raising the definitional underproductivity percentage from two to three percent per annum, 1 they effectively
snatched it back through other modifications. The 1975 statute had specified
8 2
that underproductive property was to be treated on an individual asset basis,
but the 1977 law is triggered only if the total principal of the trust does not in
any given year yield the set percentage of net income.183 In addition, the
amount to be paid has been lowered from four to three percent of inventory
value,18 4 and carrying charges which have been paid out of income apparently
will no longer be reimbursed.'8 5 Therefore, the current statute requires a significantly lower current income return than did its immediate predecessor,","
and puts much less pressure on the trustee to satisfy the needs and desires of the
87
life tenant.
Under the new total property concept, 88 the fiduciary could retain an asset
paying no yearly income which constitutes half the trust estate so long as the
other half produces a six percent return. 8 9 By permitting an overall fund solution to cover for an underproductive asset, the 1977 amendments may contravene the accepted standard that a trustee may not offset losses with gains. 9 o
T

See HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1977 Regular Session, Florida Legislature, Fla. S. 212 (Reg. Sess.
1977, introduced by S. Sayler).
Because the amendments to § 738.12 were so hastily pushed through the legislature, it is
possible that some of the weaknesses of the resulting statute were caused by misunderstandings
or oversights. For example, the 1979 law inexplicably deletes the "less any income received"
language of FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(b) (1975). FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1979). If the current
statute's literal language is followed, it would permit the life tenant to receive any income
return up to three percent during the year if that figure is not reached, and a three percent
reimbursement of "lost" income at the end of the year. Although this result is clearly not
what the legislature intended, it would result in a more reasonable level of yearly payments
to the income beneficiary. See notes 280-283 infra.
181. Compare FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1) (1975) with FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1979).
182. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1) (1975) stated "If any portion of the principal .... " (emphasis
added).
183. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1979).
184. Compare FLA. STAT. § 738.12(l)(b) (1975) (4%) with FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1979)

(3%).
185. The specific clause pertaining to payment of carrying charges in the 1975 statute,
FLA. STAT. § 738.12(l)(a) (1975), was entirely deleted as part of the 1977 revisions. FLA. STAT.
§ 738.12 (1977).
186. See notes 160-162 and accompanying text, supra.
187. The 1977 modifications do include one minor benefit for the income beneficiary,
however. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(l)(b) (1979) requires the trustee to pay the life cestui his three
percent share on a pro-rata basis in trusts which terminate in less than twelve months.
188. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1979) refers to the "total principal of a trust." Cf. FLA. STAT.
§ 738.12(1) (1975) ("any portion of the principal").
189. But see FLA. STAT. § 518.11 (1979), the "prudent man rule," which almost certainly
would hold the fiduciary open to a surcharge action by the income beneficiary if he attempted
to take advantage of the statute in this manner.
190. See A. ScoTt, supra note 1, § 213.1. If a fiduciary makes several investments which
eventually become income-deficient, he may attempt to reduce the amount of his potential
surcharge liability by creating a wash situation with more profitable investments. Id. The life
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Even if other high-yielding investments were purchased to counteract the
deficient asset, such a financial planning procedure would be improper because
there could be a corresponding decrease in corpus along with the higher return
due to the unstable value of such properties.' 9'
The new provisions have a potentially significant effect upon the trustee's
duty to prudently manage and invest the. trust's assets, because the balancing

income-source concept inherent in the statute apparently negates the common
law duty to sell underproductive property. 92 However, both common sense
and practical considerations demand that a trustee exercise his fiduciary responsibilities by disposing of such an asset through the most efficient means
possible, while still obtaining the highest price the market will pay.' 93 The

fact that an institutional trustee's fee for property management is normally
based in part upon a certain percentage of the income produced by each trust
asset may be a sufficient impetus in this regard. 9 4 .The traditional disposition
requirement probably will withstand the confusion created by the statute, but
the legislature should have prevented this problem from arising through clearer
language and more graphically delineated guidelines.
COPING WITH UNDERPRODUCTVE TRUST PROPERTY

A fiduciary managing a testamentary trust under the current Florida statute
has very few settled principles to follow in attempting to handle underproductive assets. No Florida judicial interpretation of the common law or Restatement solutions exists.1 5 The concept of yearly payment of income as an alternative to apportionment has not been adopted by any other state. 98 Therefore,

the history of a similar statute is unavailable for comparison. However, the
reasoning used by courts applying the apportionment remedy and the recomtenant can instead accept the reasonably productive assets and hold the trustee liable for the
losses incurred on the others. Id. For a typical trust situation involving both high and lowyield securities where the above rule was applied, see Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175
N.E. 761 (1931). This concept also should operate to block any attempt to "hide" an underproductive asset in a common trust fund. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 660.11-.14 (1979).
191. This becomes especially important when the wildly fluctuating corporate stock or
government bond markets are utilized for such a purpose. As for even more speculative investments, such as oil or mining operations, Professor Scott has stated that "[t]he common
element in the case of all such property is that its value will necessarily depreciate or be
destroyed." A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 239.
192. See notes 19-24 and accompanying text, supra.
193. See FLA. STAT. §§ 518.11, 737.302 (1979).
194. Barnett Banks Trust Company, N.A., for example, charges as part of its fee for
management of income-producing real estate held in a testamentary trust five percent of the
yearly gross income so derived. See Barnett Banks Trust Company, NA., Barnett Testamentary
Trust Services and Fees (1974).
195. In the only Florida case involving underproductive trust property, In re Russell's
Will, 40 Fla. Supp. 117 (Orange County Cir. Ct. 1974), the court stated "[t]hese [common law]
authorities are not applicable since they do not involve the Uniform Principal and Income
Law which is Chapter 690, Florida Statutes, and, more importantly, do not deal with the
Id. at 120.
Florida Probate Code ....
196. The states embracing the U.P.I.A. provisions have jurisdictional law closest to that of
Florida, but each of those retains the apportionment method. See note 12 supra.
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mendations of legal scholars may be used to illustrate how a trustee should
react when confronted with certain types of income-deficient property.
Perhaps the most frequent situation involving underproductivity occurs
when the asset in question is unimproved land or an empty residential or business structure. 19' If the trustee cannot successfully sell the property or improve
his position through a like kind exchange, 198 he can attempt to provide current
income through renting the property. 19 9 Long-term leases of otherwise underproductive buildings have been permitted as an effective means of obtaining
funds for the income beneficiary. 0 0 Extended-period rental contracts with or
20 1
without options to renew or purchase ordinarily bring the greatest return,
and a Florida trustee is expressly granted by statute the power to enter into
such agreements. 2' 2 Even if the settlor has stated in the trust instrument that
certain properties cannot be leased for over one year, under certain circumstances a court may ignore this stipulation and allow long-term rental for the
benefit of the trust's life cestui. 20 However, Florida's general reliance on the
trust instrument as the final determinant of the fiduciary's powers indicates that
20 4
it would be unlikely for a Florida court to take this approach.
If the fiduciary is confronted with a trust estate consisting of underproductive personal property and choses in action, the current Florida statute appears
to mandate either diversification through reinvestment in higher-yielding
sources of income or some other means of increasing yearly cash output.205
Perhaps the most common related problem faced by the trustee involves growth
197. See note 78 supra.
198. This tax-saving procedure may be preferable for assets which satisfy the provisions of
I.R.C. § 1031. See generally Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941); TREAS.
REG. § 1.1031(d)-i (1979).
199. Although a Florida fiduciary does have the power to mortgage real property held by
7
the trust under FLA. STAT. § 37.402(2)(g) (1979), courts are highly reluctant to permit this
procedure unless the trustee is specifically authorized to so act by the trust instrument. See,
e.g., Baum v. Corn, 167 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1964). Leasing is a much more preferred
practice. Compare Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 A. 648 (1929) (common law power to
rent) with FLA. STAT. § 737.402(2)(k) (1979) (legislatively-granted leasing power).
200. See In re Menzel's Will, 247 Minn. 559, 567-68, 77 N.W.2d 833, 839 (1956). The
Menzel court allowed an existing ninety-nine year lease to be extended through options to
April 30, 2105, stating that "long-term leases are necessary in order to induce investments of
But
large sums of money in improving and maintaining valuable commercial structures ....
it seems to us the most compelling consideration here is that the beneficiaries and remaindermen will receive substantial and immediate benefits from the proposed extension. The existing
terms of the lease as to rent are so disadvantageous as to deprive the beneficiaries of the full
benefits intended by the settlor. The disparity between the rent received and the actual rental
value of the property defeats in large measure the purpose of the trust." Id. at 568, 77 N.W.2d
at 839. But see Cambell v. Kawananakoa, 31 Haw. 500 (1930), which espouses the opposing
minority view.
201. Id. See also G. BOGERT, supra note 4, § 792.
202. See FLA. STAT. § 737.402(2)(k) (1979).
203. See Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 285-86, 135 A. 555, 564 (1926), where
the court invalidated the settlor's stipulation that his valuable business property located in the
downtown Waterbury business district not be leased for periods exceeding one year on "public
policy" grounds.
204. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 737A02(2) (1979).
205. See FLA. STAT. § 518.11 (1979).
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stock 2 00 and savings bonds20 as the primary or sole trust corpus assets. Stock

holdings of such publicly-held corporations as Xerox and Sperry Rand may be
excellent investments in terms of stability and future increases in value, and
thereby satisfy the trust's remaindermen.2 0s However, this type of stock frequently pays low dividends,2O which slights the interests of the income beneficiary.
If the trustee does not wish to sell the stocks or bonds immediately, he can
petition a Florida court to grant him the ability to apply "anticipatory apportionment" 210 as a corrective measure for the asset's income-deficiency. This
concept was originally applied in the Wisconsin case of In re Wehner"s W1121
to permit retention of a United States savings bond which did not pay its
maximum interest rate until its redemption date. 212 The court accepted the
trustee's novel argument that the trust could employ its liquid assets to "pur3
chase" the income beneficiary's interest in the increasing value of the bond.21
Instead of receiving his portion of the accumulated interest after an extended
waiting period, the life tenant would be provided with a yearly pro-rata share
of the accrued earnings.21 4 Through the application of the Wehner rule, both
successive beneficiaries enjoy the benefits of long-term appreciation, and the
5
fiduciary can maintain current income production while preserving principal.21
206. This type of corporate security is generally characterized by a solid historical background, excellent future prospects for expansion and increase in value, and relatively low
yearly dividend payments due to the continuing desire to reinvest earnings in the company.
See generally Aronstein, supra note 170; Duncan, Trustee Dilemma-What to Do About
Growth Stocks?, 100 TR. & EST. 533 (1961). Two such stocks are Esmark, Inc. and the
McDonnell Douglas Corporation. See MooDY's HANDBOOK OF COMMON STOCKS (1st Q. ed.

1979).
207. This note is primarily concerned with the common United States Series "E" savings
bond, involved in In re Wehner's Will, 238 Wis. 557, 300 N.W. 241 (1941).
208.
209.

See generally MOODY'S HANDBOOK
See note 204 supra.

OF COMMON

STOCKS (1st

Q.

ed. 1979).

210. This is the label applied to such activity by Aronstein, supra note 170, at 789.
211. 238 Wis. 557, 300 N.W. 241 (1941).

212. The bonds involved in Wehner were redeemable at their full annual interest rate of
2.9% only if held for the full ten years of their lives. If early redemption was desired, a lower
rate of 1.33% to 2.84% was applied according to a graduated schedule. Id. at 557, 300 N.W. at
241.
213. The court explained this reasoning by stating that "[i]n this case the trustee had
funds belonging to the corpus on hand. The trustee proposed to invest these funds and to
purchase from the life tenant the [bond] interest due the life tenant. The fund thus expended
would be restored to the corpus whenever the bonds were matured or were redeemed." Id. at
559, 300 N.W. at 243.
214. See In re Wehner's Will, 238 Wis. 557, 558, 300 N.W. 241, 242 (1941) for the table
used by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in determining the payment to be distributed
annually to the income beneficiary.
215. The Wehner court explained, "[h]ere is a security admittedly as good as any which
would be purchased in the market and bearing a higher rate of interest than any other
security equally as good .... [B]y investing the corpus in the interest earned but not payable,
which belongs to the life tenant, the funds belonging to the corpus are placed in an absolutely safe investment and the income is made available to the life tenant ....

This plan

makes the United States Savings Bonds a practical and workable form of investment for trust
funds in a manner which assures the life tenant a steady flow of income while at the same
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The revised Uniform Principal and Income Act and at least ten states have now
adopted the anticipatory apportionment rule.21 6
Although the Wehner remedy was prescribed for those jurisdictions using
the apportionment method of curing underproductivity, the rule could be
readily applied to solve the problems of a Florida fiduciary if his trust has other
corpus assets which can be easily converted into cash. Such liquid properties
could then be sold in order to pay off the life cestui in accordance with the
statutory three percent minimum income level,217 the principal being reim218
If this
bursed upon future sale or redemption of the underproductive asset.
method is accepted in Florida, it need not be limited to certain stocks2ls and

savings bonds.22 0 Potential subjects for the Wehner procedure include many
types of trust properties used as hedges against inflation through long-term
retention: works of art, antiques, collector's items, certificates of deposit, and
vacant real property.221 Through a careful balancing of liquid and growth
assets, a judicious trustee could thereby apply the anticipatory apportionment
222
doctrine to support his otherwise prudent decision to retain a trust asset.

Trust Instrument Provisions:Protection
of the Trustee
Specific language in the trust document most effectively averts any potential
problems which the fiduciary may confront during the administration of a
trust. 22 However, all difficulties related to underproductive property cannot be
time keeping the funds of the remainderman safely invested in a security of the highest type
available in any market." Id. at 562, 300 N.W. at 243.
216. See Barclay, Lot of Income Beneficiary: Remedies, 104 TR. & EST. 277, 278 (1965).
217. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1979).
218. See note 170 supra.
219. Growth stocks would be ideal candidates for the Wehner procedure. See notes 170
and 204 supra. However, such stocks as Resorts International and small mining companies
would probably face too uncertain a future to be viable for anticipatory apportionment. See
note 93 supra.
220. See note 207 supra.
221. Each of these items as a trust asset would probably be subject to a steady growth in
value ahead of or in line with the rate of inflation. Any collector's item also generally enjoys
high liquidity and can be valued through appraisal or the numerous published guidebooks.
Under most circumstances, their projected sales prices are reasonably ascertainable, which
allows the fiduciary to apply the Wehner formula to make the proper yearly payments to the
life tenant. See Etelson, The Dealer's Viewpoints: Appraisal and Disposal of Works of Art, in
COL.ETORS AND ARTISTS, PLANNING AND PROBATING THE ESTATE (1978). See also Boling, Administering Collectible Stamps, 118 TR. & EST. 9 (1979). With savings certificates, the current high
rate of inflation has made them attractive high-yield investments, paying over 12%. See N.Y.
Times, November 1, 1978, § B, at 2, col. 1.
222. Perhaps the ideal mixture for trust diversification purposes would be a combination
of corporate stocks, valuation personal properties, and both improved and vacant real property.
If necessary, mutual funds may be kept as a stable corpus item. See generally Note, Common
Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228 (1964). For an excellent discussion on the creation of
a "market" or "index" fund, which is a stock portfolio providing built-in trust asset diversification through the inclusion of different types of securities, see Langbein & Posner, The
Revolution in Trust Investment Law, 62 A.B.A.J. 887 (1976).
223. The trust instrument in general overrides any statutory or common law provisions.
See FLA. STAT. § 737A01 (1979).
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foreseen by the settlor. Nevertheless, a skilled draftsman could apply several
proposed techniques to ensure that income-deficient assets will be dealt with
properly.
The settlor's primary intent may be to shield his trustee from liability for
underproductive property.224 The grantor may desire that certain assets remain
in the ownership of his family2 2 5 because he feels that particular types of property will be better investments, 226 or that above all other considerations a
personal friend must be protected. 227 If the settlor so chooses, he may achieve
this goal through various courses of action.
One method the draftsman could apply to block breach of fiduciary duty
suits22s against the trustee by the income beneficiary is a trust provision stating
that there is no duty to sell income-deficient property.229 A Florida court has
the power to mandate deviation from such language if the burden on the life
cestui is too great, 23s but would generally follow the express terms of the instrument. 23' As an example of a "no duty" stipulation, the settlor could provide
that the fiduciary has the power to purchase low or no-dividend paying growth
stocks without regard to their failure to produce current income.232 To safeguard the life tenant's interests, the trustee should also have a coinciding duty
to invade corpus for the income beneficiary if the remainder of the trust assets
23
fails to generate enough yearly funds. .
A discretionary trust is another potential vehicle for obtaining this Tesult. 23 4
The trustee would have the power in his "absolute discretion"2 35 to determine
how all receipts and expenses should be credited, charged, or apportioned be224. For an example of this reasoning, see Clark, Power to Invest Without Yield, 100 TR.
&EsT. 495 (1961).
225. See, e.g., Berger v. Burnett, 97 N.J. Eq. 169, 127 A. 160 (1924).
226. See York v. Maryland Trust Co., 149 Md. 608, 612, 131 A. 829, 830 (1926). But cf.
Lambertville Nat'l Bank v. Bumster, 141 N.J. Eq. 396, 57 A.2d 525 (1948) (court overturned
settlor's requirement that his speculative stocks and bonds which were declining in value be

retained).
227. See generally G. BoGERT, supra note 4, § 94.
228. See id. § 701. But see Talbot v. Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 809, 296 P.2d 848 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956), which indicates that the trustee must still meet the guidelines of the prudent man
rule. See also FLA. STAT. § 518.11 (1979).
229. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text, supra.
230. FLA. STAT. § 518.13 (1979), gives a court the power to allow deviation "from the terms

of any will, agreement, or other instrument relating to the acquisition, investment, reinvestment, exchange, retention, sale or management of fiduciary property."
231. See note 223 supra.
232. See Clark, Power to Invest Without Yield, 100 TR.& EsT. 495, 495 (1961). The sug-

gested clause states: "Anything in my Will or in any code, statute or legal decision of any state
or the United States of America to the contrary notwithstanding, my trustee, to the extent it
deems such purchase or purchases in the interest of the life tenant and remaindermen, may
invest the funds of the trust in low or zero yielding securities or other assets which, in the
judgment of my trustee, have adequate growth potential to provide a satisfactory investment

accomplishment in terms of future income and/or appreciation in value." Id.
233. Id. at 496.
234. See generally A. ScoTr, supranote 1, §§ 187-187.5.
235. For a Florida court's interpretation of this term, see Wallace v. Julier, 147 Fla. 420,
438,3 So. 2d 711, 718 (1941).
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tween principal and income. 236 Therefore, the fiduciary would supposedly have
complete control over how much the life cestui should receive yearly, leaving
23 7
income-deficient property outside the scope of the fiduciary's concern.
Notwithstanding the intent of the draftsman, "absolute discretion" does
not in fact grant the massive power so purported.38 The trustee remains under
a duty to treat the successive beneficiaries impartially, "2 9 and must still make a
reasonable determination as to whether a particular item is income or corpus
to avoid charges of abuse of discretion. 2 40 Advantageously, this discretionary
provision frees the fiduciary from the controls of the local law, which may be
unsatisfactory or vague.2 4 ' The current Florida underproductive trust property
statute is one such example, 242 and the settlor may have more faith in the
propriety of his trustee's future actions than in the provisions of the law.
The addition of an exculpatory clause may be the least effective way of
attempting to block surcharge actions against the trustee for a failure to remedy
underproductivity.' 43 In this manner, the settlor may try to prohibit lawsuits
by providing that the fiduciary would not be liable in connection with such
24
However, one
property "except for his willful default or gross negligence."'"
only
a presumptrust
clause
as
establishing
Florida court interpreted a similar
to act in
his
obligation
absolving
and
not
trustee's
actions,
of
the
tive validity
245
faith.
good
One jurisdiction now considers granting such a broad sanctuary for the
fiduciary as contrary to public policy. 46 A Florida settlor therefore probably
would be unable to protect his trustee in this manner for any acts beyond
47
ordinary negligence.
236. See Hauser, Tax Problems in Principal and Income Provisions of Trusts, in THEm
THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW CENTER

ff69-601

(P. Heckerling ed. 1969). "Absolute discretion" is defined by this commentator as really
meaning: "(1) in apportioning items between principal and income, the trustees are not restricted by the law of the particular forum; and (2) a reasonable determination of the
trustees as to whether a particular item is principal or income will probably not be considered an abuse of discretion." Id.
287. But see, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 92 Ala. 587, 542, 9 So. 195, 197 (1891).
288. Hauser, supra note 286, [69-601.
289. See Wallace v. Julier, 147 Fla. 420, 437, 8 So. 2d 711, 717 (1941).
240. Hauser, supra note 236, 69-601.
241. Id.
242. See notes 180-194 and accompanying text, supra.
243. See generally G. BOGERT, supra note 4, § 542; A. Scort, supra note 1,§§ 222-222.4.
244. For an example, see In re Jarvis' Estate, I10 Misc. 5, 180 N.Y.S. 324 (1920), where the
Surrogate held that the trustee's failure to sell declining value securities within a reasonable
time period constituted "gross neglect" for the purposes of the exculpatory clause.
245. In re Will of Wickman, 289 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974). Chief Judge Mann held
in this case that a trust clause stating that "[t]he values which my trustees or executors may
place upon any property so allotted, provided, and distributed shall be final and conclusive
upon all persons having any interest therein" did not block the trust beneficiaries from seeking
various remedies based on the trustee's alleged gross undervaluation of certain trust properties.
Id. at 790-91.
246. New York has abolished "gross negligence only" exculpatory clauses through legislative action. See N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.7 (Consol. 1976).
247. See A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 222.3.
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Protectingthe Income Beneficiary
The creation of special trust provisions to require that the life cestui be
provided with a reasonable amount of income has been the subject of extensive
debate.248 A variety of concepts have been suggested to cure insufficient current
cash output.249 The most practical solutions to this dilemma are the reallocation of principal and income charges and earnings,250 the percentage of income
25 3
payout method, 251 the annuity trust, 252 and the so-called unitrust.
If the settlor fears that certain assets which will become part of the trust
property may become underproductive, he may help mitigate the situation by
redirecting various trust receipts and expenses to and from their normal courses.
For example, as a potential remedy for low-yielding stocks, the draftsman might
stipulate that those corporate distributions which in Florida are otherwise allocable to principal 254 be considered part of the life tenant's income share. 255
The value of the corpus stock would remain unaffected while the income beneficiary gains a representative share of the proceeds, in effect permitting the
256
fiduciary to retain a valuable corporate asset.
A similar opportunity exists for the settlor where depreciable real property257 is the potential income-deficient asset. If a trust reserve expense for
depreciation is established, the income beneficiary faces a double dilemma.
Depreciation is customarily charged to income under the reserve account system, 258 and the life tenant loses the benefit of the accompanying income tax
deduction.29 Subsequent underproductivity of the property further exacerbates
the income beneficiary's predicament by not reimbursing him for this expense. 260 However, the depreciation allocation problem may be solved through
remedies of varying degrees. The settlor's refusal to create a reserve account
248. See, e.g., Wells, Pity the PoorIncome Beneficiary, 50 TR. BULL. 30 (1970).
249. See generally Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. Rxv. 228 (1964).

250. The many different systems which have been employed to allocate corporate distributions are discussed in Flickinger, A Trustees Nightmare: Allocation of Stock Dividends Be-

tween Income & Principal,in 3

LANDMARK PAPERs ON ESTATE PLANNING, WILLS, ESTATES AND

TRusTs 1093, 1096 (Winard comp. 1968).
251. See Barclay, supra note 216, at 277.
252. See STEPHENSON, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS AGREEMENTs: ADmnaiTrNsnsvE PRoVISIONs
§ 3.7(I)(e) (1952).
253. See David, Principaland Income: Obsolete Concepts, 43 PA. B.J.Q. 247 (1972).
254. Corpus-allocated receipts include stock dividends, stock split receipts, and liquidation
proceeds. FLA. STAT. § 738.06(1)-(3) (1979). Cash dividends, monetary rights involving companies other than the distributing corporation, and constructive dividends from Subchapter S
corporations are deemed income. FLA. STAT. § 738.06(3)-(5) (1979).
255. See Note, supra note 249, at 238.
256. For a model trust instrument provision which would put such reasoning into practice,
see note 232 supra.

257. See I.R.C. § 167(a). This note assumes there are no I.R.C. § 1250 recapture problems
caused by accelerated depredation methods for the trust property discussed herein.
258. See FLA. STAT. § 738.13(i)(b) (1979).
259. See I.R.C. § 167(h) (1979); TREAs. REG. § 1.167(h)-1(b), T.D. 6712 (1979).
260. The depreciation expense, if large enough, may virtually reduce the amount of the
trust's distributable net income to little or nothing if a reserve is created and charged to the
income account. See TREAS. RaG. § 1.652(c)-4, T.D. 6712 (1979).
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would enable the tax deduction to pass directly to the life tenant.26 1 If the
income beneficiary is to be favored even further, the settlor could request that
depreciation be levied on corpus instead of income, creating an additional cash
flow of income in the amount of the expense.2 62 Because the reallocation of
depreciation could result in erosion of the principal, 26 3 the settlor must determine the likelihood of the asset's underproductivity and which beneficiaries are
most important to him before incorporating this type of provision into the
trust instrument.264

Several legal scholars have argued that the settlor should include a trust
clause mandating distribution of a certain percentage of the market value of
the overall trust property to the income beneficiary.2 65 The current Florida
underproductive property statute 26 6 initially appears to put this theory into
effect. However, in reality the law falls far short of effectuating the theory by
failing to provide a sufficient level of income. As opposed to the statutory three
percent payment of income,2

67

the proponents of this theory suggest the adop-

tion of the projected rate of inflation, expected bond yield, passbook savings
interest, or another relative standard. 268 Each of these alternatives would result
in a significantly higher rate of return than that created by the inadequate
Florida provision.
The proposed "unitrust '269 also applies the percentage-based income method
of countering underproductive assets by combining the trust's original principal
and income-connected receipts into a single fund. Under this system, a fixed
percentage rate of annual income payout would be calculated by adding the

projected income to the probable amount of corpus appreciation, and then
deducting a reasonable reserve amount for losses due to inflation and other
causes.2 7 The Florida trust draftsman should not incorporate the unitrust
concept if the settlor wishes to use a conventional marital deduction trust,27 1
however, because all of the unitrust's income is not necessarily distributable.272
261.

See FLA. STAT. § 738.13(I)(b) & (3)(b) (1979).

262. TREAS. REG. §§ 1.167(m)-l(b), 1.652(c)-4, T.D. 6712 (1979).
263.

See generally FERGUSON, FREELAND & STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES

AND BENEFICIARIES, 310-19 (1970).
264.

See generally Note, DEPRECIATION AS A TRUST EXPENSE, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 41 (1951),

which provides an early but still valuable discussion of this area.
265. See, e.g., STEPHENSON, supra note 252, at § 3.7(2) (1952): Barclay, supra note 216, at
277; Wells, supra note 132, at 120. For the special problems involved when the life tenant
is a charity, see Hauser, supra note 236, f 69-611.
266. FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1979).
267. See FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1979).
268. See note 265 supra.
269. This concept was originally proposed in Lovell, The Unitrust, 105 TR. & ESr. 215
(1966), as a method of reducing the amount of conflict between the successive trust beneficiaries
by eliminating the problem of whether to allocate receipts and expenses to principal or
income.
270.

See David, supra note 253, at 250.

271. Id. at 251. For an examination of the use of these very common estate planning devices, see Cornfeld, Marital Deduction Trust, in USE OF TRUSTS IN ESTATE PLANNING 383
(1979).
272. David, supra note 253, at 251. See generally G. BocERT, supra note 4, § 811.
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A similar solution to the life tenant's concern is the creation of an annuity
trust, which effectively overrides underproductivity difficulties through the
payment of a specified annual dollar amount.273 To guard against inflation, the
draftsman can stipulate that the trustee shall either purchase and set aside highyielding corporate stocks or bond issues as a definite income source,274 or that
the set payments are to be supplemented with a cost of living adjustment based
on the Consumer Price Index or similar extrinsic evidence.75 As with the
percentage payment method, the annuity trust is subject to the disadvantage of

forcing the settlor to state now what he feels should be a proper future return
to the income beneficiary.276 However, in spite of this minor deficiency, these
systems of counteracting later income production shortcomings are valuable
estate planning tools as long as the fiduciary retains the ability to make adjustments in the annual payments as necessary,
CONCLUSION

The current Florida underproductive property statute establishes an unprecedented rule of administrative convenience for the corporate and private
trustee through a total trust estate concept.277 However, this advantage is more
than outweighed by the law's inequitable treatment of income beneficiaries.
The threat posed to the life tenant's interests is made apparent by the fact that
a simple passbook savings account would create a greater rate of return than
that now authorized by the statute.278 Moreover, the current inflation rate of
approximately one percent per month vastly outstrips the law's limited bene9

fits.27

Because of these inherent problems with the statute, the settlor of a testamentary trust to be administered in Florida should be certain to include in his
trust instrument those provisions he believes necessary to maintain a steady,
reasonable flow of funds to the life cestui while ensuring a protected corpus. In
addition, the trustee must be either provided with the necessary powers and
resources to dispose of underproductive assets or be shielded from surcharge
liability for failing to do so. The uncertain status of the law applicable to
Florida fiduciaries will otherwise force the trustee to act overcautiously in such
dealings, and thereby penalize all of the trust beneficiaries in terms of lessened
cash receipts and a dwindling corpus.
Certain modifications to the underproductive property statute should be
made to help correct this dilemma. As recommended by the alternative statute
273. See Barclay, supra note 216, at 280.
274. Such a fixed-payment trust can be created through a trust instrument clause stating
that "If... shall survive me, I direct my executor to select and set apart from my estate highgrade securities sufficient in his judgment to produce an annual income of not less than...
Dollars (S.. .), and the securities so selected I bequeath to ... in trust to pay ... the sum of
...
Dollars ($.. .) annually out of the income, with power to make up any deficiency out of
the principal." STEPBENSON, supra note 252, § .7(l)(e).

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Barclay, supra note 216, at 280.
Id. at 277.
See notes 181-191 and accompanying text, supra.
See N.Y. Times, November 1, 1979, § A, at 11, col. 2.
See Gainesville Sun, November 2, 1979, § 2, at 1, col. I.
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appended to this note,280 the "individual asset" definition of income-deficient
property 21 should be reinstated as the best means of protecting the interests
of the successive beneficiaries. In addition, the yearly substituted income
amount28 2 must be raised to a more realistic figure such as six percent per
annum in order to provide for a reasonable return to the life tenant. Furthermore, the carrying charge reimbursement provision should be resurrected in
order to repay the income beneficiary for such expenses. 28 3 Finally, the 1975
statute's limited application to "property being held for appreciation"

28 4

should be restored as necessarily bringing under the law only those assets which
28 5
the settlor expected to produce yearly funds.

The Florida legislature must act to meet the requirements of the life cestui
of a testamentary trust, for many of them depend on this income for basic support.28 0 By replacing the apportionment remedy with annual percentage-based

payments, the lawmakers took the first step. However, the most recent amendments should be eliminated from the underproductive property statute, with a
more realistic level of yearly substituted income being required. With these
revisions, Florida law would finally effectuate the settlor's intent that the life
tenant not starve so the remainderman may ultimately feast.

287
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APPENDIX

Proposed Underproductive Property Statute,
Replacing Current FLA. STAT. §738.12 (1979)
(1)If any individual asset of the trust principal is being held for appreciation, either by
direction of the settlor or in the discretion of the trustee, and such property does not in any
year yield a net income of at least 6 percent of its inventory value (including as income the
value of any beneficial use of the property by the income beneficiary), such asset is underproductive, and at the end of such year the trustee shall pay to the income beneficiary from
the principal, using the first principal cash available, an amount equal to the sum of the
following:
(a) Any carrying charges upon such property paid out of income during such year, and
(b) Six percent of the inventory value of such property, or, in default thereof, of its market
value at the time the principal was established or its cost when purchased later, less any
income received and the value of any beneficial use of the property by the income beneficiary during the year.
280. This proposed statute attempts to put into force many of the proposed amendments
to FLA. STAT. § 738.12 (1979), along with requiring accepted standards of prudence. See notes
192-194 and accompanying text, supra.
281. See FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1) (1979).
282. See note 172 supra. Note that this amount must also be paid on a pro-rated basis if
the income interest does not last for a full twelve-month period. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(b)
(1979). Because this provision correctly allows the life tenant to receive his partial interest, it
is retained as part of the proposed underproductive property statute found in the appendix.
283. See notes 157-179 and accompanying text, supra.
284. FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1) (1975).
285. In order to make this determination properly, the trust instrument must be examined
along with the related extrinsic circumstances that the grantor so intended. York v. Maryland
Trust Co., 149 Md. 608, 131 A. 829 (1926). See notes 66-71 and accompanying text, supra.
286. See, e.g., In re Rowland's Estate, 273 N.Y. 100, 6 N.E.2d 393 (1937).
287. In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 327 Pa. 171, 174, 193 A. 30, 32 (1937).
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